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mavis86410
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Consistent with this monitoring argument, Weisbach (1988)
reported a higher correlation between CEO turnover and company performance for companies in which outsiders predominated on the board of directors than for companies in which insiders predominated.
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) also found that the addition of another outside director to the board increased firm value.会的就帮下忙把~
推荐答案:蜀国大将军回复于2008/02/28

Brickley, Coles,and Terry 发现:当董事会大多数的董事不参与管理的时候(外部董事占董事会很大比例的情况下),毒丸策略(股东权益计划)对股票(证劵)市场一般是有效的。反之,则是无效的。出现这种情况的前提是,外部董事们代表了股东们的利益。

不太明白,有些乱翻的意味。
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mavis86410
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Brickley, Coles,and Terry (1994) found that the average stock market reaction to announcements of poison pills is positive when the board has a majority of outside directors and negative when it does not. Both these findings are consistent with the premise that outside directors represent shareholder interests.
Brickley, Coles,and Terry 发现当董事会大多数的董事不参与管理的时候,股票市场对毒丸策略的反应是积极的 。反之,则对股票市场的反应是消极的。这两个发现的前提是,要体现出不参与管理的股东的利益。 大家再修改修改~~~
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Last edit by mavis86410
蜀国大将军
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原文由 mavis86410 发表:
Consistent with this monitoring argument, Weisbach (1988)
reported a higher correlation between CEO turnover and company performance for companies in which outsiders predominated on the board of directors than for companies in which insiders predominated.
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) also found that the addition of another outside director to the board increased firm value.会的就帮下忙把~

Consistent with this monitoring argument,weisbach(1988)提出:外部董事主导董事会的公司与内部董事主导董事会的公司相比,前者在CEO(执行总裁)离职与公司业绩方面有更高的相关性。

Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) 也发现:在董事会增加外部董事 会增加企业(公司)的价值。

有些别扭,水平就这样了。
蜀国大将军
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原文由 mavis86410 发表:
Brickley, Coles,and Terry (1994) found that the average stock market reaction to announcements of poison pills is positive when the board has a majority of outside directors and negative when it does not. Both these findings are consistent with the premise that outside directors represent shareholder interests.
Brickley, Coles,and Terry 发现当董事会大多数的董事不参与管理的时候,股票市场对毒丸策略的反应是积极的 。反之,则对股票市场的反应是消极的。这两个发现的前提是,要体现出不参与管理的股东的利益。 大家再修改修改~~~

Brickley, Coles,and Terry 发现:当董事会大多数的董事不参与管理的时候(外部董事占董事会很大比例的情况下),毒丸策略(股东权益计划)对股票(证劵)市场一般是有效的。反之,则是无效的。出现这种情况的前提是,外部董事们代表了股东们的利益。

不太明白,有些乱翻的意味。
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